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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
Managed futures funds, both in the number of funds and the assets under 
management, have been growing rapidly. Irwin and Brorsen (1985) ascribe the genesis of 
the large managed futures industry to the mid-1970's although the first futures fund was 
considerably earlier. The growth has continued up to the present with over $25 billion 
invested in managed futures (McCafferty 1994). Managed futures have some similarity to 
stock mutual funds. Both managed futures funds and stock mutual funds build a portfolio 
of their respective securities, for managed futures funds this consists of a portfolio of 
futures contracts and other assorted securities. In stock mutual funds the portfolio consists 
of assorted stocks and varying amounts of other assorted securities. 
There are many reasons why investors choose to invest in mutual funds. Many of 
these reasons for choosing to invest in mutual funds are equally applicable to managed 
futures funds: customer service, low transaction costs (in the form of low overhead and 
low commissions but not to be interpreted as low fees charged by the fund manager), 
diversification, and professional management (Gruber 1996). Low transaction costs differ 
from fees charged by fund managers in that transaction costs refer to commissions and 
overhead associated with mutual funds. The fees charged by fund managers are fees 
charged for the perceived management ability of the fund manager and will be incurred 
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even if no trading occurs. 
A new article by Goetzmann and Brown (1997) argues that hedge funds exist to 
exploit market inefficiencies. Hedge funds have fewer restrictions on trading than mutual 
funds. Hedge funds can short sell, arbitrage, and trade derivatives. Funds exist because it 
is the cheapest way for the fund manager to raise capital. Since different funds exploit 
different inefficiencies, different levels of performance can be expected. The returns could 
be a function of dollars under management. If the amount of dollars under management is 
. small relative to other funds, it may be easier for the fund manager to exploit inefficiencies. 
As the dollars under management flows into a superior performing fund, the fund manager 
may have more difficulty in exploiting inefficiencies due to the larger amount of dollars 
under management. Fund managers may also increase management fees which offset the 
returns (part of the returns are consumed in the manager's fees). 
Teweles and Jones (1987) identify several reasons why investors tum their money 
over to professional fund managers but state, "the primary reason is probably the 
perceived expertise of the professional manager." (Teweles and Jones, p. 255) There are 
several other reasons cited, such as the ability of funds to diversify the portfolio into many 
futures markets and through this diversification, reduce the risk of the fund. 
With growth in the managed futures market, the question now becomes which 
fund or funds should be invested in? In the fund selection process undertaken by investors, 
a valid question to be answered is, do funds that have done well in the past tend to also do 
well in the future? The existence of performance persistence with managed futures funds 
has been a source of debate. Funds are said to exhibit performance persistence if the funds 
that do best in one period tend to do as well or better in the next period. If persistence 
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exists, then selecting which funds to invest in would include the historical returns of each 
fund as well as other factors. 
The issue of whether stock mutual funds exhibit performance persistence is also 
controversial. Whether or not performance persistence exists depends on which study is 
being evaluated. Volkman and Wohar (1995) found performance persistence in mutual 
funds and attempted to break down this fund persistence into measurable parts. Elton, 
Gruber, and Blake (1996) found that in risk-adjusted mutual fund returns, the past return 
does contain information about future performance of that fund. Carhart (1997) was able 
to explain away almost all predictability of returns as factors of strategies and fees. Gruber 
(1996) found that performance persistence not only existed, but also commented on the 
strength of the persistence. 
It is important to note that in mutual funds, it is possible to purchase stocks with 
the intention of using a buy-and-hold strategy. This strategy, with a well diversified 
portfolio, may yield positive annual returns as long as the trend for those stocks is upward. 
The stocks could be held indefinitely and yield positive returns. This differs from a 
managed futures fund in that futures funds may practice short term hold-and-buy 
strategies only until the delivery date of the futures contract, at which time the contract 
must be offset or delivery made or taken. Kolb (1992) found that for most commodities, 
the expected return of both a buy and hold or sell and hold strategy would be zero because 
prices do not tend to be higher or lower the longer the time until expiration. This lack of a 
trend in prices being higher or lower makes taking either position, buy and hold or sell and 
hold, have zero returns. 
An important point to raise is that futures funds must use professional management 
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because a buy-and-hold strategy in futures would generate substantial transactions costs 
( due to rollovers) and has been shown to be a losing strategy (Lukac, Brorsen, and Irwin, 
1988). The necessity of active management may allow easier identification of performance 
persistence, as any positive return requires professional management, as opposed to 
positive stock returns which can be obtained by using a buy and hold strategy. 
However, Schwager (1996) found in his review of literature of performance 
persistence in managed futures funds, inconclusive evidence that the best performing funds 
can be predicted. Zweig {1996) pointed out that using Gruber's method of performance 
persistence (picking the top 10% of funds each year from a fixed list of227 funds) would 
only slightly outgain (+$2156) a buy and hold strategy using an index Gruber developed to 
measure the risk of the whole market. 
The question posed is does performance persistence exist in managed futures 
funds? By using past performance as the only selection criterion, can the superior 
performing fund or funds be selected? This study will attempt to answer the questions by 
. determining if historical returns are a predictor of future performance by using regression 
analysis and the non-parametric analysis described by EGR' s method having corrected for 
heteroskedasticity (Gruber, et al 1996). The study was expanded to include measures of 
risk I return in the form of an adjusted Sharpe Ratio. 
Managed futures funds are similar in·some aspects to mutual funds in that a 
pooling of funds from different investors are held united and traded as one pool or fund. 
For this study, the terms fund and pool are interchangeable. These pools or funds may be 
managed and traded by one commodity trading advisor (CTA) or a team ofCTA's, 
depending on the choice of the pool operator. The CTA determines, according to their 
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own preferred trading style, what percentage of the funds under their management will be 
used to cover margins incurred from positions in the futures market. This is defined in this 
study as the "leverage" of the fund. For many futures funds, margins necessary for the 
holding of positions have been put in the form of U.S. securities instead of cash. The 
futures fund puts up U.S. securities whose current market value is equal to or greater than 
the margin requirement. The most common example being Treasury Bills. This allows the 
funds necessary for margin maintenance to earn interest. The remainder of the funds in the 
pool are also usually invested in U.S. Treasury Bills. 
The funds are classified as either public or private. Public funds are offered to the 
public and that generally have smaller minimum investment requirements than private 
funds. These funds can be advertised, and the fund manager must provide a prospectus to 
the potential investors. Public funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
A private fund also consists of pooled funds but is not available to the general 
public. This means the private fund cannot be advertised, and solicitations for the fund to 
the public cannot be made by fund managers. Private funds are not required to be 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. CTA funds are distinguished by 
being managed by a single account manager. The CTA data include returns earned from 
trading for public and private futures funds. 
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Objective of the Study 
The general objective of this study is to determine if performance persistence exists 
in managed futures funds. The specific objectives of the study are: 
1) To determine if the weighted monthly mean returns for each fund across time 
are significantly different from each other for public funds, private funds, and 
CT As. 
2) To determine the size and power of prior methods that used a nonparametric 
method consisting of Spearman Rank correlation relative to a new approach using 
regression which adjusts for changes in aggregate performance of the funds and 
heteroskedasticity. 
3} To determine if the historical mean returns, intercepts, or adjusted Sharpe ratios 
of a fund can predict the future performance of that fund. 
Outline of Procedures 
For each of the objectives, the data are separated into each fund type: CTA data, 
public fund data, and private fund data (Laporte Management ltd., unpublished data). 
For the first objective, individual fund monthly returns are regressed against an 
overall monthly mean return calculated from all funds. Slopes and intercepts are allowed 
to differ by fund. The hypothesis tested is whether the intercepts calculated for each fund 
in the regression are all equal. This hypothesis tests if any fund has a significantly different 
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intercept from the other funds. This significantly different intercept is analogous to the 
"skill component that cumulates over time" suggested by Goetzmann and Ibbotson 
(1994). 
The second objective will be accomplished with a Monte Carlo study where 
simulated returns are generated with different values and assumptions (SAS, 1990). The 
Monte Carlo study will test if the nonparametric methods used by Elton, Gruber, and 
Rentzler (EGR) can in fact detect performance persistence from data sets generated by 
Monte Carlo methods. Using these Monte Carlo methods, one data set was generated 
with performance persistence present and the other data set was generated with no 
performance persistence present. By eyaluating the non-parametric methods used by EGR 
against both generated data sets, the size and power of EGRs methods can be determined. 
The final objective is accomplished by calculating measures of persistence for the 
selection period and the performance period. Spearman' s coefficients are calculated 
between the rank of the persistence measure calculated in the selection period and the rank 
of the persistence measure calculated in the performance period. The Spearman 
coefficients use a test statistic calculated for each selection/performance period to 
determine if the ranking (based on return) of the funds between the selection and 
performance period is significant. The final evaluation method uses the method used by 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) in determining if persistence is present in mutual funds. A 
two-way contingency table of ranked fund returns of various selection and performance 
periods is presented to determine if funds that were winners in the selection period 
continue to perform well in the performance period due to skill of the manager. 
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Organization of the Study 
Theoretical basis and the review of literature are contained in Chapter II. Chapter 
III presents the objectives in order by objective and method used for that objective. 
Chapter IV presents the results from each objective. Chapter V presents the conclusions. 
8 
CHAPTER II 
DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE 
Fund Performance 
The efficient market hypothesis has three forms as put forward by Fama (1970). 
The weak form of market efficiency indicates that prices reflect all information available 
from past prices (Teweles and Jones 1987). This form is based on the premise that all 
information related to past prices and trading, such as volume and open interest, if indeed 
containing predictive value, is already built into the current price. This argument usually 
brings a chorus of criticism from those traders using technical trading systems, which the 
theory says would be ineffective if the market price reflected all information from past 
pnces. 
The semi-strong form deals with the speed with which price adjustment occurs 
given a release of information. This form argues that all published information is already 
reflected in the price (Teweles and Jones 1987). Information in the form of market 
reports, government reports, earnings reports, and the like already have the information 
built into the price. Using this argument, to successfully trade, a trader would have to have 
access to a source of information not readily available to the whole market or obtain that 
information prior to release to the market. 
The strong form of the hypothesis maintains that prices reflect all information that 
can be acquired (Teweles and Jones 1987). This form is concerned with the availability of 
information to all markets participants, in that even information researched by imaginative 
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researchers, is already included in the price. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argued that it was impossible for markets to be 
informationally efficient. They proposed a model to refine the efficient markets notion that 
allows for traders to profit. The model is based on the premise that prices reflect 
information from informed traders, but only partially. They argue that informed traders are 
compensated for the risk that they take. Informed traders profit by taking "better'' 
positions than their uninformed counterparts. 
Jensen (1969) defines an efficient market as one where all past information 
available is reflected in the current price. Jensen argues that if security prices actually 
follow the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, then traders and fund managers 
can not earn above average returns by trying to predict future prices based on past 
information. The only way to earn superior returns is to be the first with a new piece of 
information not available to all traders.· This appears to follow Grossman and Stiglitz' s 
theory of small disequilibriums in markets caused by differences in information that allow 
some to earn superior returns. 
These forms of the efficient market hypothesis ask some interesting questions 
concerning whether performance persistence can exist or not. The first question, and most 
relevant question asked is, is performance persistence, by definition, an inefficiency in the 
markets? Since performance persistence reflects a fund manager's superior ability, or the 
ability to consistently outperform other fund managers, by definition this is an inefficiency 
in the market. However, this inefficiency would be short lived. A fund manager that 
identifies a superior approach will be recognized by investors and have more money flow 
into that manager. This increase in dollars under management would cause a decrease in 
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the managers returns to the equilibrium level. This reduction in returns follows the theory 
that no above normal returns can be consistently earned by managers. 
The information gathered by the trader may be difficult to obtain or process. The 
trader has separated themselves from the rest of the market by establishing a monopolistic 
hold on some form of information. 
Another form that market inefficiency may take is the timing and availability of 
information. When a manager receives the information may allow for small inefficiencies 
to occur in the market. The managers may actively take advantage of those inefficiencies 
in information delivery. This inefficiency may quickly disappear as instantaneous 
information delivery is now becoming the norm around the world, making information 
delivery inefficiencies less frequent. However, most manage~ futures traders are not 
information traders, they are technical traders. Beja and Goldman (1980) suggested the 
theory that "the trendists demand is not based on a security's fundamental prospects". 
(Beja and Goldman, p. 245) Trendists do respond to the price adjustments in the market 
brought about by fundamental traders. Trendists trade based on the information used by 
fundamental traders. 
Fama postulates that the long-term returns from trading in the futures market using 
one CTA or several, as in a private or public fund will have gross profits of zero since the 
empirical research seems to support the efficient market hypothesis. The expected return 
from such strategies is zero because Fama assumes no transaction costs. If transactions 
costs are included, then net profits will be negative. However, even if all traders do not 
have all the information, according to Fama, this allows for the efficient market hypothesis 
to hold since Fama stated "the market may still be efficient if a sufficient number have the 
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information". 
Assuming the market is truly efficient, investors, upon hearing of the superior 
performance of the fund manager, would flood the manager with new funds to be 
managed. This influx of capital would cause the returns of the fund manager to go down 
and the returns from the fund to go down as well. 
Jensen points out that the "loading charge" is basically a sales fee that the fund 
manager charges for the service of managing funds. The data sets tested do not include 
information regarding loading fees. Is it not reasonable to assume that fund managers who 
were successful would raise their loading charge and fees to reflect their "better" 
management style? Would managers increase these fees to capture the additional returns 
until the return to investors was that of the risk free rate? 
Following this line of theory, performance persistence would not exist. Ifinvestors 
could accurately predict a fund's future returns based on its past returns, then the investor 
could effectively predict which funds will produce the highest future returns. Having this 
ability, investors would simply select the fund or funds with the highest historical returns 
and obtain positive gross profits which conflicts directly with Fama' s theory. However, 
there are several weaknesses in this line of reasoning. First, managed futures are a 
relatively new investment and so the information investors need to evaluate returns may 
not have been available. Second, the earning preferences of the CTAs may cause them to 
choose different fee structures. Finally, capital may be constrained for various reasons. 
If performance persistence exists, then historical returns can help predict future 
returns. For this study, modeling the returns involves a model analogous to the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Hirt and Block (1993) defined the CAPM as a model by 
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which an asset is valued based on its risk characteristics. This model creates a new 
investment variable, it being the risk-free rate and combining it with the efficient frontier 
concept. The risk-free rate is defined as the lowest risk security with zero default risk. 
U.S. Government securities are considered risk-free. The efficient frontier is a linear 
representation of risk-return possibilities for different investment portfolios. 
The model used in this study is similar to the security market line (SML) which is 
used to express the trade off between return and risk for an individual stock. For this 
study, the SML provides the tradeofffor an individual fund. The general form of the SML: 
(1) 
where~ is the anticipated return based on this formula,~ is the risk-free rate of return, 
Pi is the measure of the volatility of the security with respect to the market in general, and 
KM represents the market rate of return. 
The model proposed for the study attempts to model the stochastic process: 
(2) r;t = a; + P,r, + eit i = 1, . . ., n t = 1, ... , T 
where rit is the return of fund ( or CT A) i in month t, parameter Pi represents differences in 
leverage, r1 is average fund returns in month t. Pi allows each fund to have a different 
variance which is consistent with research. For this study, the term "leverage" represents 
the percentage of dollars in the fund devoted to margins. Leverage acts as a risk indicator 
since it reflects the percentage of funds tied to margins as opposed to funds invested in 
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"safer'' securities, specifically government securities, T-Bills, bonds, etc. Fund returns are 
generated as a function of the risk-free rate, the leverage the fund uses, and the monthly 
mean fund returns. 
If persistence did not exist, then based on the model above, a regression of the 
returns should reveal the intercept of each fund to not be significantly different from the 
intercept of all the other funds. The intercepts should be a proxy for the risk-free rate. 
Although (2) is not exactly a CAPM, it does have components that form a basic structure 
that follows the thinking of the CAPM. This being that returns are a function of the risk-
free rate and a measure of risk for each fund. Even though the funds may have different 
leverage amounts, the risk-free rate should be uniform across all funds. If the intercepts 
are different across years for different funds then that could be interpreted as the intercept 
is not just the risk-free rate. The intercept is instead is: 
(3) 
where Pi is some factor unique to that fund. It has been debated to exactly what Pi should 
represent. Two major theories have been put forward. One being that the factor is the 
management style of the CTA running the fund. Management style refers to several factors 
used by the CTA in managing the fund including leverage, commodities traded, or trading 
systems used. The other theory argues that it reflects the transaction costs of the fund. For 
this study, since persistence is be tested, it will be assumed that the management style is 
what will affect the intercept. 
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Previous Studies in Mutual Funds 
Performance persistence has been researched more extensively in the field of 
mutual funds than in the field of managed futures funds. This is expected as mutual funds 
have existed longer than managed futures funds. Carhart {1997) tested for performance 
persistence in mutual funds using three different performance measurement models 
including the CAPM and a four-index model designed by Carhart. He determined that 
there was only slight evidence of skilled or talented fund managers and that persistence 
only lasts one year. 
Zweig (1996) states that no one has proved persistence exists in mutual funds. 
However, citing Gruber, he points out that Gruber found by buying last year's hottest 
funds, he could beat out the market index average for returns. He also showed that trading 
on yearly winners in the mutual fund market does increase returns, but only slightly, and 
any gain is lost to paying transaction costs. 
Kahn and Rudd {1995) used "style" analysis. From the results, it was determined 
that in both equity and fixed income funds, investors should not base selection of a trading 
advisor solely on historical performance. However, persistence was found to be present in 
fixed income funds, but past performance should not be the sole determinant of what fund 
to invest in. 
Elton, Gruber, and Blake {1996) found that in mutual funds, historical 
performance does contain information about future performance and the intercepts, 
referred to from this point on as the a's, from 1 and 3 year selection periods convey 
information about future performance. They also found, like Carhart, that for 1 year 
performance periods, the prior year's performance appears to contain the most relevant 
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information. 
Volkman and Wohar (1995) chose to not only study if persistence exists, but if so, 
what are the components of that persistence. They identified three systematic components 
that influence persistent fund performance. These are past performance, fund goal, and 
management fee (Volkman and Wohar 1995). 
Khorana and N elling ( 1997) devoted a small portion of their article to the study of 
performance persistence in a specific mutual fund type called sector funds. Two methods 
were used, a cross-sectional comparison for performance across sectors and a comparison 
to a known index, in this case, the S&P 500. A nonparametric runs test was performed to 
check for sector fund manager persistence. A run was defined as an uninterrupted 
sequence of good-performance or bad-performance months (Khorana and Nelling 1997). 
The tests found that among 123 sector.funds, only 15 exhibited persistence, most of which 
were under performing, that is, those that did poorly continued to do poorly (Khorana 
and Nelling 1997). 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) addressed several issues in their paper on mutual 
fund persistence. They stated that "The investment performance of an individual mutual 
fund is likely to contain both a skill component and a noise component. The skill 
component would cumulate over time, while the noise component would be serially 
independent so that its average would tend toward zero over time." As compared to other 
studies, Goetzmann and Ibbotson chose to compare fund returns to each other, rather than 
to an absolute benchmark. Results showed significant performance persistence in multiple 
selection periods including two-year selection and two-year performance periods, 
persistence in one-year selection and one-year performance periods, and when funds were 
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differentiated according to the "style" of the fund. Monthly returns were also tested to 
determine if a month's rank is related to last month's rank. Persistence was found in raw 
return data and a measure of risk called the "Jensen measure" pulled from Jensen's article, 
which is the alpha from the CAPM empirical analogue (Goetzmann and Ibbotson 1994). 
The article points out that to effectively select winning fund advisors, a long selection 
period should be chosen to eliminate noise in the performance data, but not so long as to 
allow the fund manager to change the trading system being used. 
As with Goetzmann and Ibbotson's article, the potential for survivorship bias 
exists in our data set. Some of the commodity funds were closed down, most likely poor-
performing funds. However, the survivorship bias in our study is partially mitigated by the 
same reason that it was in Goetzmann and Ibbotson's article. The bias is partially 
mitigated by the fact that our study compares survivors to other survivors relative 
performance (Goetzmann and Ibbotson 1994). Fund performance is not measured against 
an absolute benchmark, but rather against other funds. 
Phelps and Detzel {1997) use the same methodology as Goetzmann and Ibbotson 
but expand it to include a risk control. They contended that persistence found in prior 
research was a result of insufficient risk controls (Phelps and Detzel 1997). They argued 
that any persistence found may be a form of macropersistence, or persistence in broad 
equity classes, rather than micropersistence, or the skill of an individual trader. Using 
indices to evaluate whether macropersistence or micropersistence was responsible for the 
prior results. Using one, two and three year selection periods, they found no significant 
persistence in the data and concluded "It does not appear that there is a reliable strategy 
for selecting funds expected to have superior future performance, other than to avoid 
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funds with high expense ratios." (Phelps and Detzel, p. 67) 
Gruber, in his 1996 presidential address, not only stated that persistence existed, 
but that he was amazed by the strength of persistence. Gruber stated he had found 
persistence and that sophisticated investors money flowed into and out of funds based on 
indicators of future performance. 
Overall, the research seems inconsistent with some studies using the same 
methodology finding different results. Goetzmann and Ibbotson found significant 
persistence using two-year selection and performance periods. Phelps.and Detzel used the 
same methodology but expanded it to include a risk control and found no significant 
persistence in the data. Carhart found little evidence of skilled managers. Khorana and 
Neiling no evidence of persistence in sector funds. Elton, Gruber, and Blake found strong 
evidence of persistence. Kahn and Rudd found that persistence was present. Overall, the 
evidence is inconclusive, but does seem to favor short-run persistence. 
Previous Studies in Managed Futures Funds 
There have been a few studies of performance persistence in managed futures 
funds including Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1987), Edwards and Ma (1988), Irwin, 
Krukemeyer, and Zulauf (1992), McCarthy, Schneeweis, and Spurgin (1997), and 
Schwager (1996). Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (EGR)(1987) found that superior 
performing commodity funds generally could not be selected based on past performance of 
that fund. The exception being risk level of a fund, measured by EGR as the standard 
deviation of a fund. EGR found that standard deviation of a fund appeared to be a good 
, indicator of the relative riskiness of a fund. Schwager also reviewed several studies that 
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were concerned with determining if perfonnance persistence is present in returns and risk 
levels. These include EGR, Edwards and Ma, Irwin, Krukemeyer, and Zulauf (IKZ), 
Irwin, McCarthy, and Irwin, Zulauf, and Ward. 
Edwards and Ma limited their study to prepublic pool returns and postpublic pool 
returns with a goal of determining if the CFTC should change the regulatory fashion with 
which public fund returns are disclosed. They bring up the point if the past perfonnance 
infonnation is useless, should the CFTC continue to mandate its publication? The 
methodology involved regressing two years of post-public returns against three years of 
pre-public returns, the fee structure used by that particular pool, conditions during the 
futures market during the post-public returns, and an error tenn. With the measure of 
persistence being a significant positive relationship between the pre-public returns and the 
post-public returns (Edwards and Ma 1988). The prepublic mean monthly return across all 
funds was 4% while the postpublic mean monthly return was -.1 %. Their conclusion 
addressed a different issue than this study, the issue of perfonnance persistence between 
pre-public pool returns and post-public pool returns. Edwards and Ma studied if 
perfonnance persistence was present between a fund's returns before it went public and 
the returns of that fund after it went public. The results showed no perf onnance 
persistence was found between pre-public pool returns and post-public returns. 
Prospectuses are required by law to include the statement "Past perfonnance is not 
indicative of future perfonnance." Edwards and Ma asked if this is an accurate statement. 
In fact, this a lawyerly statement that is mostly true for several reasons. First, it is 
important not to confuse relative fund perfonnance with absolute fund perfonnance. 
Relative performance of a fund compared to other funds does not mean that the absolute 
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returns earned by that fund in the past will have predictive power as to the absolute 
returns in the future. Second, the problem of selectivity bias pointed out by Edwards and 
Ma also must be addressed. Selectivity bias is the when funds are selected on the basis of 
past returns when past returns explain only a small portion of the variation in a return and 
random error explains most of the variation in a return. If most of the variation in the fund 
return is not explained by the variable used to select which fund to invest in, then logically, 
the future returns will not be accurately predicted by looking at past fund returns. 
McCarthy, Schneeweis, and Spurgin (1997) concentrated on CTA's combining to 
form public commodity funds. They found that pro forma unadjusted historical returns 
from each CTA tend to overestimate post-offering returns from that fund. This would 
seem to support the results found by Edwards and Ma. However, when risk is included in 
the returns, past returns are more accurate in predicting later returns than when risk is 
excluded from returns. This article also confirmed what several other studies have found 
such as EGR and others, in that past risk is a good indicator of future risk of the fund. 
Irwin, Krukemeyer, and Zulauf compared the correlation between a pool's return 
in one year and its return in the subsequent year over the time period 1979-1989 (Irwin, 
Krukemeyer, and Zulauf). The correlations were calculated for pool performance for 4 
pool groups: all pools, the top third performing funds, the middle third performing funds, 
and the bottom third performing funds. Standard deviations and Sharpe ratios were also 
compared from one year to the subsequent year. When all pools are considered, they 
concluded that only the standard deviation had a sufficiently large correlation coefficient 
(.451) to be economically meaningful. When pools are stratified into thirds, the 
correlations are slightly larger, but IKZ still conclude that "it is debatable whether any 
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strategy to select public commodity pools can be used to obtain an economically 
meaningful increase in performance." (Peters, p. 422) 
EGR made one adjustment in their analysis of performance persistence to account 
for the possibility that all fund variances were not the same when using returns as a 
predictor of future returns. One of the measures of performance used by EGR is a Sharpe 
Ratio, which is calculated using the standard deviation of the fund and therefore allows for 
different fund variances. They used a nonparametric method to test for performance 
persistence. This nonparametric method consisted of the Spearman Rank correlation. This 
nonparametric method consisted of comparing the relative rank of the annual return of a 
fund during a historical period (referred to from this point on as the selection period) to 
the relative rank of the same funds return during the following year (from this point on 
referred to as the performance period). 
Some evidence to support the argument that performance persistence exists was 
found in the form of risk levels and mean returns from year to year. However, they chose 
to conclude that there was no evidence of performance persistence in mean returns. 
Schwager comments that EGR appears to have already made up their minds or simply 
ignored any evidence that contradicted their opinion. EGR misidentified a problem, not 
recognizing the heteroskedasticity in the data, and used a method that has virtually no 
power to reject the null hypothesis ofno predictability in mean returns. 
However, the prior literature may have misidentified a statistical problem, which is 
actually heteroskedasticity. To confirm that each of the raw data sets does violate the 
homoskedasticity assumption, a test for heteroskedasticity was performed on the public, 
private, and combined CTA data sets. Each of the funds use differing amounts of leverage, 
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some use high margin, highly volatile commodities while others use less volatile, low 
margin commodities. Knowing this, the assumption of homoskedasticity does not hold. 
Even though this assumption does not hold, prior studies still used nonparametric 
methods. Nonparametric methods can not correct for heteroskedasticity caused by 
different amounts ofleverage between funds except for the Sharpe Ratio used in prior 
studies. This paper takes a different approach from the prior studies by assuming 
heteroskedasticity among different funds and correcting for it by using regression analysis 
rather than nonparametric methods. 
Prior literature used methods devised by Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (EGR). 
These methods were found to have no power to reject the null hypothesis of no 
predictability (Grossman, 1987) when the assumptions ofEGR's method were true. This 
would bias the results to show no significant persistence even when persistence was 
substantial. The power problems also include small sample size and a problem with short-
run negative autocorrelation. A Monte Carlo study of the methods ofEGR will determine 
if Grossman's criticisms of their methods are justified. Generating data sets with various 
conditions, nonparametric methods can be evaluated for ability to identify when 
persistence is present. 
Correlations between funds are important because if one fund with less leverage 
did well when funds with larger amounts ofleverage are doing poorly, a negative 
correlation exists. If both groups do well at the same time, a positive correlation exists. 
Neither EGR or Schwager account for·different levels ofleverage used by different fund 
managers. Failure to account for the different levels ofleverage, the two methods argue 
that the fund managers use the same trading systems or that the systems differences are 
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negligible, ignoring the heteroskedasticity problem. 
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CHAPTER ill 
PROCEDURES 
This chapter presents procedures used in this study. The methods used to 
transform the data and to check for data accuracy are presented. The methods used to test 
the homoskedasticity and normality assumptions are explained. Next, the procedures used 
to conduct hypothesis tests on monthly mean returns are presented. The procedure for the 
Monte Carlo analysis of the nonparametric method employed by EGR is presented as is 
the procedure for using the same nonparametric method on the futures fund data. Finally, 
the nonparametric persistence tests use_d by Goetzmann and Ibbotson are described. 
Data 
The data are grouped by whether the returns are for a public fund, a private fund, 
or a commodity trading advisor (CTA). The data begin in 1978, but few funds were 
trading at that time. Public funds are defined as funds that were publicly offered to any 
investor with sufficient capital. The minimum capital requirement for these funds is 
generally less than that of a private fund. Brorsen and Irwin (1985) stated that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) classifies a futures fund as public if limited 
partnership interests are sold in a public offering and as a rule of thumb, private funds have 
less than 3 5 investors. A private fund may be offered to only a select group of investors 
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and is regulated as a private investment by the SEC unless specific tests are met. The CTA 
returns are from funds that are managed by individual CT A's, as opposed to the public 
and private funds which may have several CTA' s. The CT A fund data was originally 
separated between those funds that are active (still being traded) and those funds that are 
dead (no longer being traded) but for this study the active and dead CTA data set were 
combined. The original data contained considerable missing values since many funds did 
not trade the entire period. These missing values were recorded as zeroes. The data source 
is LaPorte Asset Allocation. Most of the data originated from Managed Accounts 
Reports. 
The data were cleaned of missing values by deleting observations where returns 
equaled zero and net asset value equaled zero and leverage equaled zero. The important 
note is that observations with a return of zero were not deleted because of the possibility 
that zero was the true return and should be included in the cleaned data set. Only data 
missing all values for all three zero conditions were deleted. 
The relevant data used from the sets consisted of monthly percentage returns for 
different funds over time, the corresponding month and year of the return, and the name of 
the fund. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the data sets and of the variable of 
interest, the percentage return. 
As with past research, the CTA funds have the highest mean returns. This may be a 
result of selectivity bias, but since this study is comparing CT As to other CT As and not to 
another type of investment, such as mutual funds, this is not a problem. The number of 
observations show that the CTA data set has the largest number of observations and 
number of funds, having over twice as many observations and funds as the private funds. 
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Table 1 shows that the CTAdata has the highest variance of the fund types, 
followed by the private funds, with the public funds having the smallest variance. This can 
be interpreted to indicate that the CT A funds have the_ most risk associated with them. The 
results show that none of the fund types have skewness present but table 1 also shows that 
returns from all three fund types are leptokurtic. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Public, Private, and Combined CTA Data Sets 
and Continuous Time Returns 
Data set Public funds Private funds Combined CTA' s 
Observations 32420 23723 57018 
#Funds 577 435 1071 
Percentage returns 
Mean 0.31 0.62 1.28 
SD 7.68 9,22 10.53 
Minimum -232.69 -224.81 -135.48 
Maximum 229.73 188.93 239.79 
Skewness -2.08 -0.49 1.14 
Kurtosis 133.91 40.70 24.34 
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Tests of Homoskedasticity and Normality 
Two procedures were used to test the assumptions ofhomoskedasticity, normality, 
skewness, and relative kurtosis of the rescaled residuals. This procedure is necessary to 
determine if the rescaling of the residuals corrects the problem of heteroskedasticity. This 
study hypothesizes that the homoskedasticity assumption is incorrect. For this test, the null 
hypothesis is Ho: Var( ei J = o2 and the alternative is HA: Var( ei J = a/. 
The regression returns against fund dummy variables and an average monthly fund 
return using EGLS. The regression is specified as: 
n-1 n-1 
(4) 
r11 = a0 + L al1 +. L n1P;r, + e11 j = 1, ... , n - 1 
j=l j=l 
t = 1, ... , number of months 
where rjt is the returns for fund j in month t, °.i is the fund dummy variable, and i, is the 
monthly average return across funds. 
Monthly average returns are calculated across funds. Returns are indexed by 
weighting each observation by the dollars invested in the fund. The value-weighted index 
is derived as: 
nt 
L percretit * Doli 
(5) - i=l rt = .-------nt 
LDoli 
i=l 
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where ~ is the percentage return in month t and Doi; is the dollars under management of 
the fund. 
The variance of the data is defined as: 
(6) 
where n,; is a dummy variable for funds. There are n-1 dummy variables created in the 
regression, where n=the number of different funds, to represent the variation individual to 
that fund. 
The regression method used was estimated generalized least squares (EGLS). The 
generalized least squares estimator used is: 
(7) 
where X is the matrix of fund dummy variables and monthly average fund return, y is the 
vector of returns, and '¥ represents the unknown covariance matrix that will be estimated. 
This method is necessary since heteroskedasticity is present. 
Returns are regressed against a fund dummy variable and a month average return 
interaction variable (see equation 4). The residuals from this regression are squared and 
saved. These squared residuals are regressed against the fund dummy variables (see 
equation 6). From this regression, the predicted variances are calculated for the data. 
From this regression, an F-statistic is calculated for the hypothesis test that all the 
variances as a group are equal to zero. If the statistic shows significance, then the null of 
homoskedasticity is rejected. The procedure is the same for the public, private, and the 
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combined CTA data sets. 
Rescaling Residuals 
To rescale the residuals, the reciprocal is taken for the predicted variances from the 
regression of the variance against the fund dummy variables (see equation 6): 
1 
(8) w. = -I A 
a, 
where the wi are the square roots of the diagonal elements of the predicted variance. A 
possible problem area is the possibility of some funds having only one or two observations 
in the data set, therefore giving the fund zero variance and causing computational 
problems. To avoid having this problem, observations with a weight greater than 100 were 
deleted. 
The final regression uses the model in equation 4. The percentage returns are now 
weighted by 1 over the predicted variance of the fund (see equation 8). Weighting allows 
for heteroskedasticity between the funds owing to the different risk levels of each fund. 
Table 2 shows the results from the test for homoskedasticity. Results show the 
tests for the public, private, and CTA funds reject the Ho, indicating that heteroskedasticity 
is present in the data. 
The next test is the normality test with the rescaled residuals. The residuals are 
from the regression of the returns on the fund dummy variables and fund dummies and 
average return interaction variables. These residuals were rescaled by dividing each 
residual by the square root of the predicted variance. From these rescaled residuals, the 
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skewness and kurtosis are calculated for the rescaled residuals. The test statistic used is 
the Jarque-Bera test for normality. Under the null hypothesis that the error terms are 
distributed normally, the test statistic is distributed as a :;:2<2>· Clarke (1996) found that a 
normal distribution is not a correct assumption for managed futures funds, the returns 
exhibited higher skewness than returns for many derivative market indices. This was 
partially attributed to the nonstationary variance of the funds which would cause 
leptokurtosis. 
Table 2 shows the results of the homoskedasticity and normality tests on the 
rescaled residuals. The null hypothesis ofhomoskedasticity was rejected for all three fund 
types. This confirms that heteroskedasticity is present in the residuals for each of the 
funds. 
Table 2. F-Statistics for the Test ofHomoskedasticity Assumption and Jarque-Bera 
Test of Normality of Rescaled Residuals 
Data set Public funds Private funds Combined CTA' s 
Homoskedasticity 1.41 4.32 5.15 
Residuals 
Skewness -0.17 -0.02 0.35 
Relative 
Kurtosis 3.84 3.05 2.72 
Normality of e 20059*· 9192* 18735* 
• Asterisks denote significance at the .005 level. 
The results from the skewness tests show that none of the three fund types have 
skewed residuals. However, the tests show each fund type has kurtosis present in the 
residuals. The normality of the error terms is also rejected. Rescaled residuals actually 
have at-distribution rather than a normal distribution. Several funds have less than 30 
observations, thus, we should expect the remaining leptokurtosis which was found. 
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Testing If Fund Monthly Mean Returns as a Group Are Significantly Different from 
Zero 
The first objective of this research is to answer a fundamental question regarding 
commodity funds, that being, are average monthly returns across funds the same after 
adjusting for returns on all funds? Heteroskedasticity is assumed to be present in all the 
data sets. Using regression techniques that are capable of handling heteroskedasticity by 
transforming the variables and correcting for this problem, an asymptotically valid test can 
be conducted. 
The regression technique used was the same EGLS method used in the prior 
section. From the regression, a weighted ANOVA (analysis of variance) is completed. A 
type III analysis of variance is completed by using the SS3 option ofPROC GLM 
command in SAS. A type III analysis of variance calculates the sum of squares for 
individual explanatory variables and calculates the sum of squares for interaction terms 
between explanatory variables. This is a regression with dummy variables, the dummy 
variables representing the individual mean returns from each different fund. A weighted 
ANOV A was performed to correct for the heteroskedasticity in the data. If the data are 
not weighted to reflect different variances, the heteroskedasticity present would cause the 
estimates to be inefficient and the hypothesis tests would be invalid. The regression first 
calculates the sum of squared errors for the individual means of the funds. These results 
show the percentage of total variation in returns that the individual fund mean returns 
explain. The sum of squared errors for monthly mean returns is then calculated. These 
results show the percentage of total variation in returns explained by the monthly mean 
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return of all the funds. 
In completing the ANOV A, computing a degrees of freedom adjustment for each 
fund for the test of normality is required. However, the degrees of freedom adjustment 
results in no gain in asymptotic properties. 
A separate regression will be run on the public funds, the private funds, and the 
CTAs. The joint hypotheses to be tested from these estimates are: H0 : a.; = 0 Vi and 
H 0 : P; = 0 Vi. 
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Structure of Monte Carlo Study 
Data Generation 
Monte Carlo Study 
The Monte Carlo simulation uses a data generating model based on the same 
model used to model the stochastic process that generates the returns. The data generating 
model is specified as: 
(9) r;, = a; + Pr, + e;, i = 1, . . ., n t = 1, ... ,120 
eit - N(O, CJ/). 
Data sets were generated using a, P, and CJ specified by the author. The a ,p, and CJ 
matrices are t x 1 matrices where t = 120 different funds for which returns are being 
generated. From these values , 24 months of returns were generated for 120 funds. This 
procedure was repeated 1000 times. The mean return over all funds r,, is derived from the 
values of a and p. The equation for rt is: 
:E a.i + :Ee;, 
n n (10) r, :;: 
:EPi 1 -
n 
The data sets were generated using the Interactive Matrix Language (IML) module of 
SAS. The data sets were generated using a fixed value of a to simulate no performance 
persistence with a fixed seed of 31313 for the RANNOR command (random number 
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generator) in SAS. The intercepts were set to 1 for the data generated with no persistence 
present. For the data sets generated with persistence present, a. was allowed to vary and 
was generated using: 
(11) Ct.CTA - N(l.099, 4.99) 
(12) a.Public - N(.278, 1.35) 
(13) Ct.Private - N(.279, 5.20) 
which were obtained from the GLM regressions (see equation 4) on the combined CTA 
data (equation 11), public funds (equation 12), and private (equation 13). These values 
differ from the values in table 1 since table 1 presents statistics using the raw returns. 
Data were generated with different values for p. For the data generated with fixed 
P, a value of .5 was used. The differing P's included 4 different values. The P's took the 
new values in equal fourths. The four values of Pare .5, 1, 1.5, and 2. These values 
encompass the range of most of the actual P's found. 
Under homoskedasticity, data sets were generated with a fixed a value of 2. 
Heteroskedasticity was imposed on the data sets by changing the value of a from 2 to 4 
different variances, these being 5, 10, 15, and 20. One fourth of the P's were set to each 
value. This allowed comparing the Spearman coefficient calculated for data sets with 
homoskedasticity and data sets with heteroskedasticity. 
The funds were ranked in ascending order of returns for period one (first 12 
months) and period two (last 12 months). From each 24 month period of generated 
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returns, Spearman coefficients were calculated to identify the correlation between a fund's 
rank in period one and period two. For the Spearman coefficient, if the number of pairs of 
rankings is greater than ten, the distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution 
(Dowty and Wearden 1991). In this case, the number of funds that have a ranking in 
period one and period two are the number of pairs (120), therefore, the normal 
distribution is applicable. Spearman's coefficient (r,) is calculated as: 
(14) r = 1 - __ ;=_1 __ 
s N(N2 -1) 
where dis the difference in rank of a fund between period one and period two. The 
differences in rank are summed up across the total number of funds represented by N. The 
null hypothesis for the Spearman coefficient is: 
(15) E(r) = 0 
and the test statistic is calculated as: 
(16) 
·, - 0 
z = 1 = r,JN - 1 ~ 
From the calculated z values, the p-values were calculated for each repetition of 
the study. The p-value is the probability of obtaining a difference between the sample 
statistic and the hypothetical population parameter that is at least as extreme as the one 
actually observed assuming the Ho is true. The smaller the p-value, the stronger the case 
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against Ho. The p values were separated into three groups, those that failed to reject the 
Ha: .025< p value < .975, reject Ha with a positive z, p value < .025 and those rejections 
with a negative z, p value > . 97 5. A percentage value was then calculated for all the 
repetitions using the formula: 
(17) number of observations 
number of repetitions of data generated 
where the number ofobservations represents the number of observations from the 
generated data set that were statistically different from the observed value while the 
number of repetitions of data generated is the number of data sets generated by the 
simulation. These percentage values are being calculated to determine the size and power 
of the test. The power of the test is defined as 1 minus the probability of Type II error. 
Type Il error is defined as failing to reject a Ho when it is in fact false. The Monte Carlo 
simulations that generated data with persistence present by allowing the a' s to vary refer 
to the power of a test. The size of a test refers to the probability of Type I error. Type I 
error is rejecting the Ho when it is in fact true. The Monte Carlo simulations that generated 
data with no persistence present refer to the size of a test. 
Mean returns were then calculated for each fund in period one and period two and 
ranked. The ranks were divided into three equal subgroups composed of the funds with 
the top third highest mean returns, middle third mean returns, and bottom third mean 
returns. Two additional subgroups were separated out, the top 3 highest mean returns 
funds and the bottom three funds with the lowest mean returns. The means across all 
funds in the top third group and bottom third group were calculated. A test of two means 
was done to determine if the returns from the top third funds and the bottom third funds 
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are significantly different. 
The power problems the EGR method is expected to have with means may not 
also exist in tests using Sharpe ratios. The Sharpe ratios include a measure of variance 
which allows for differing funds to have differing variances. The Monte Carlo simulation 
generated 24 and 60 months of monthly return data for 120 funds. Each sample was 
partitioned into selection period and performance period. The mean returns for each 
period were calculated. From the means, the sum of squares was calculated for each 
fund's returns during each period. The variance of each fund's returns was calculated. A 
simple Sharpe ratio was calculated for each fund by dividing the funds mean return by the 
standard deviation of the funds returns during that period. This process was repeated for 
both the selection period and the performance period. The Sharpe ratios were ranked in 
each period and the Spearman correlation coefficient was calculated between the selection 
period and the performance period. The Spearman correlation coefficient was tested for 
significance. 
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Historical Performance as an Indicator of Later Returns 
4 Year Selection Period, 1 Year Performance Period 
This procedure was to determine if any one of several historical performance 
measures provides information on the performance of a fund in subsequent years. The 
Monte Carlo study completed in this paper shows that the methods used by EGR have low 
power when evaluating the a' s or mean returns when heteroskedasticity is present in the 
data. However, in light of this problem, this method is appropriate when the residuals are 
rescaled to compensate for the heteroskedasticity present in the data. 
Gruber (1996) chose selection periods of 1 year and 3 years. This study chose a 4 
year selection period with a 1 year performance period and was performed on the private, 
public, and CT A data sets. The 4 year selection period was chosen to allow several years 
of rankings to be included in the selection period as opposed to only one year to avoid the 
problem of short-run negative autocorrelation. The same procedure to correct for 
heteroskedasticity in objective one is also used in determining if historical performance is 
an indicator of future returns. Since the returns are monthly, funds that had fewer than 60 
monthly observations were deleted to avoid having missing months of data. 
A generalized linear model (see equation 4) was used to regress the returns against 
the average fund return. The data were split into the 4 year selection period and the 1 year 
performance period. The first 5 year period evaluated was 1980-84. The periods were 
repeated until the finalperiod, 1991-1995. Testing for persistence was done on three 
parameters derived from the regression, the a 's (intercept), the mean returns, and a lo 
(adjusted Sharpe Ratio). For each parameter derived from the regression, a Spearman 
coefficient was calculated between the rank of the parameter from the 4 year selection 
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period and the rank of the parameter for the 1 year performance period. The same 
coefficient was calculated for the mean return and the a la. The Spearman coefficient, (see 
equation 14) was calculated. The null hypothesis of an expected value of O for the 
Spearman correlation coefficient (see equation 15) can be tested with a z test (see 
equation 16). The z-statistic was calculated and evaluated at a=.05. 
Historical Performance as an Indicator of Later Returns 
Two-Way Tables of Multiple Selection and Performance Periods 
The second method of evaluation used the method of Goetzmann and Ibbotson 
(1994). This method used raw return data from predetermined selection and performance 
periods. The method compared the classification of the mean fund return as a winner or 
loser in each period. Data were separated into chronologically nonoverlapping samples 
which included selection period and performance period. Each sample was then separated 
into returns from the selection period and returns in the performance period. 
The data were then sorted by fund name. Each fund then had the simple mean 
calculated for its returns in each period. The simple mean was calculated by summing the 
monthly returns across the selection period and dividing by the number of monthly returns 
in the selection period. This is referred to from this point on as the selection mean return. 
For the performance period, the monthly returns across the performance period were 
summed and divided by the number of monthly returns in the performance period. This is 
referred to as the performance mean return. Each fund now has a selection mean return 
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and a performance mean return. 
The median is calculated for the individual fund selection mean returns. From this 
median mean fund return, funds are classified as winners or losers. The classification as a 
winner is mean return of the fund is greater than the median. The classification as a loser is 
mean return of the fund is less than the median. The median is then calculated for the 
individual fund performance mean returns. The classification as a winner or loser is based 
on the median of the performance period. The use of the median as the criteria for 
classification as winner/ loser is based on the methods used by Goetzmann and Ibbotson. 
The results are then reported in two-way tables of winners and losers for each 
period. Results show funds are classified into one of four subgroups: winner/ winner, loser 
/loser, loser/ winner, and winner/ loser. The winner/ winner group reflects the number of 
funds classified as a winner in the selection period and also classified as a winner in the 
performance period. The loser/ loser group shows the number of funds classified as losers 
in the selection period and classified as loser in the performance period. The final two 
groups, loser/ winner and winner/ loser reflect the number of funds that respectively, fell 
into each classification based on performance. 
A two-way table was chosen for the simplicity and ease of interpretation of the 
results. Cumulative numbers of funds that fell into each category are presented at the end 
of each two-way table. The percentages in the cumulative results represent the percent of 
funds in each performance period classification (winner/ loser) as a percentage of the 
funds in each selection period classification. For winners in the selection period, what 
percent of winners also won in the performance period and what percentage lost. From 
these percentages, a ratio of the likelihood of a fund continuing prior performance is 
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calculated. 
For robustness of the results, selection periods and performance periods were 
varied. The periods tested included consecutive two-year periods. The data was 
partitioned into four-year nonoverlapping samples. Each four year block was then 
partitioned into two two-year periods. The chronologically earlier two-year period was 
designated the selection period. The later two-year period was designated the performance 
period. The procedure was repeated for consecutive three-year fund returns and 
consecutive one-year fund returns. The procedure then chose a three-year selection period 
and two-year performance period, and two-year selection periods with a one-year 
performance period. In each variation of the length of the selection and performance 
period, if, at the end of the data set, the remaining years of data did not form a complete 
sample (three-year selection period and three-year performance period), then the 
remaining data was deleted. 
The hypothesis of no persistence is that the ratio of winners in the selection period 
to winners in the performance period should be 50/50. A fund that is a winner in the 
selection period is just as likely to be a loser in the performance period. This hypothesis is 
tested by evaluating the ratios of winners in the selection period to winners in the 
performance period, with the same ratio calculated for losers in the selection period who 
are also losers in the performance period. · 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Joint Test of No Difference in a's across Funds 
Table 3 shows a weighted ANOVA table of the general linear model. Table 3 also 
shows the mean and variance of a which are used in the Monte Carlo study. It also shows 
the F-statistic values calculated for the joint tests of no difference in a' s across funds and 
the values for the joint tests of no difference in P's across funds. The results show that 
funds and pools do not all have the same mean returns. This finding is not consistent with 
prior research, but not surprising for several reasons. Following the efficient market 
hypothesis there may be several reasons why all funds do not have the same mean returns. 
Table 3. Weighted ANOVA Table: Returns Regression for Public Funds, Private 
Funds, and Combined CTA Data 
Fund Type Public funds Private funds Combined CTA' s 
Sum of Squared Errors 
Ind. means 1751 1948 2333 
Group mean 28335 10882 ·22751 
Corrected Total 62221 36375 82408 
R2 0.48 0.35 0.31 
Mean 
a 0.278 0.297 1.099 
Variance 
a 1.16 2.277 2.240 
F-statistic 
a's 2.94 4.32 2.12 
Ws 47.44 24.10 20.61 
Efficient markets would dictate that superior performing funds would have capital 
flow into the fund from poorer performing funds assuming no transaction costs. This shift 
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of capital would have two effects. The funds with capital flowing into them would have 
their returns decrease and the funds with capital flowing out of them would see their 
returns increase. However, there are transaction costs to shifting capital from one fund to 
another. Load fees, withdrawal fees, and penalties for shifting capital may make it costly 
to move the capital to the better performing fund. Investors may also choose to shift the 
capital out of the managed futures market, in which case capital still does not flow from 
poorer performing funds to better performing funds. 
Another reason for capital not shifting from poorer performing funds to better 
performing funds is that the better performing fund may be closed. Closed meaning that 
the fund is not accepting any new investments. Capital from poorer performing funds 
could flow into the better performing fund, but since no new investment is being taken, 
some capital from poorer performing funds must go somewhere else. 
The results show that the individual means do explain some of the variance of the 
returns. This supports the contention that some funds earn significantly different returns 
than other funds do across years. The differences in individual means explain roughly 2-
4% of the variance in the public funds. This is a small amount of predictability and requires 
precise methods to take advantage of it. 
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Analysis of Power of EGR Method 
A Monte Carlo analysis of the power and size ofEGR's method is now presented. 
Table 4 shows the calculated mean returns from each subgroup of funds generated with no 
persistence present. The results indicate the size of the test when no heteroskedasticity is 
present. There is a slight tendency to reject too often when heteroskedasticity is present. 
The results show the size is slightly low but still reasonable in the test of two means. 
Table 4. Performance Persistence Results (EGR method) for Mean Returns Over 
Consecutive 1-Year Periods from Monte Carlo Generated Data Sets: No Persistence 
Present by Fixing a's to 1 
Generated Data Subgroups 
Mean returns 
top.1/3 
middle 1/3 
bottom 1/3 
top 3 
bottom 3 
p-values 
reject-positive z 
reject-negative z 
fail to reject 
test of 2 means 
1· 
1.25 
1.25 
1.25 
1.25 
1.26 
.021 
.028 
.951 
reject-positive .026 
reject-negative .028 
fail to reject .946 
aData generated using a=l, P=.5, o=2. 
bData generated using a=l, P=.5, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
Data Generation method 
2b 
1.25 
1.25 
1.22 
1.15 
1.19 
.041 
.037 
.922 
.032 
.020 
.948 
'Data generated using a=l, P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
3c 
0.70 
0.72 
0.68 
0.61 
0.68 
.041 
.039 
.920 
.032 
.026 
.942 
Table 5 shows the calculated Sharpe ratios over consecutive one-year periods 
generated with no persistence present. The results again indicate the size of the test is 
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correct when no heteroskedasticity is present. However, when heteroskedasticity is 
present, the null hypothesis is rejected more than 5% of the time. Most of the rejections 
favor positive correlations. Thus, with Sharpe ratios, rejection of performance persistence 
can occur when the performance persistence is in the variance, but not the mean. The 
results show the size is slightly low but still reasonable in the test of two means. 
Table 5. Performance Persistence Results (EGR method) for Sharpe Ratio Over 
Consecutive 1-Year Periods from Monte Carlo Generated Data Sets: No Persistence 
in Mean Present by Fixing a's to 1 
Generated Data Subgroups 
Mean returns 
top 1/3 
middle 1/3 
bottom 1/3 
top 3 
bottom 3 
p-values 
reject-positive z 
reject-negative z 
fail to reject 
test of 2 means 
1· 
0.67 
0.66 
0.66 
0.66 
0.66 
.024 
.023 
.953 
reject-positive .029 
reject-negative .027 
fail to reject .944 
-Oata generated using a=l, P=.5, a=2. 
1Data generated using a=l, P=.5, a=5, 10, 15, 20. 
Data Generation method 
2b 
0.15 
0.14 
0.13 
0.16 
0.11 
.095 
.004 
.901 
.046 
.013 
.941 
cData generated using a=l, P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, a=5, 10, 15, 20. 
3c 
0.09 
0.08 
0.08 
0.10 
0.07 
.055 
.009 
.936 
.042 
.016 
.942 
Table 6 shows the calculated Sharpe ratios over a fo11r- year selection period and a 
one-year performance period from each subgroup of funds generated with no persistence 
present. As with the prior results, the size of the test is acceptable when no 
heteroskedasticity is present. When heteroskedasticity is present, the tests reject the null 
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hypothesis more often than with the one-year performance period. As before, the results 
show the size is slightly low but still reasonable in the test of two means. 
Table 6. Performance Persistence Results (EGR method) for Sharpe Ratio Over 
Four-Year Selection Periods and 1-Year Performance Periods from Monte Carlo 
Generated Data Sets: No Persistence Present in Mean by Fixing a's to 1 
Data Generation method 
Generated Data Subgroups 1a 2b 3c 
Mean returns 
top 1/3 0.67 0.16 0.10 
middle 1/3 0.66 0.14 0.08 
bottom 1/3 0.67 0.12 0.07 
top 3 0.67 0.18 0.12 
bottom 3 0.67 0.11 0.06 
p-values 
reject-positive z .025 .206 .115 
reject-negative z .024 .001 .004 
fail to reject .951 .793 .881 
test of 2 means 
reject-positive .024 .071 .047 
reject-negative .030 .008 .008 
fail to reject .946 .921 .945 
anata generated using a=l, P=.5, o=2. 
bData generated using a=l, P=.5, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
'Data generated using a=l, P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
Table 7 shows the results of testing EGR's ability to find performance persistence 
when it really exists in mean returns over consecutive one-year periods. Although the 
results differ somewhat across all columns, the results show that overall, the power of the 
Spearman's coefficient is high in all columns except for column four. Column one shows 
that the null hypothesis is always rejected. Columns two and three show the null 
hypothesis rejected over 80% of the time. Only column four shows a substantial failure 
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(.848) to reject the null where heteroskedasticity is present and the performance 
Table 7. Performance Penistence Results (EGR method) for Mean Returns Over 
Consecutive 1-Year Periods from Monte Carlo Generated Data Sets: Persistence 
Present by Allowing a's to Vary 
Data Generation method 
Generated Data Subgroups 1· 2b 
Mean returns 
top 1/3 3.21 2.77 
middle 1/3 1.87 2.09 
bottom 1/3 Q.80 1.41 
top 3 4.93 3.47 
bottom 3 -1.60 1.14 
p-values 
reject-positive z 1.00 .827 
reject-negative z .000 .000 
fail to reject .000 .173 
test of 2 means 
reject-positive 1.00 .268 
reject-negative .000 .000 
fail to reject .000 .732 
8Data generated using a=N{l.099,4.99), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, a=2. 
1Data generated using a=N{l.099,4.99), P=.5, a=5, 10, 15, 20. 
3c 
2.57 
1.85 
1.15 
3.26 
0.86 
.823 
.000 
.177 
.258 
.000 
.742 
'Data generated using a=N{l.099,4.99), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, a=5, 10, 15, 20. 
IIJ)ata generated using a=N(l.099,1), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, a=5, 10, 15, 20. 
persistence is small. 
4d 
1.48 
1.30 
1.14 
1.68 
1.06 
.149 
.003 
.848 
.043 
.012 
.945 
The results from the test of two means show that the test works poorly with 
heteroskedasticity present. This shows EGR's nonparametric method of using Spearman 
correlation coefficients on performance measure variables with no adjustment for 
heteroskedasticity does have substantial power problems and is inappropriate for testing 
for performance persistence. Table 8 shows the results of testing EGR' s ability to find 
performance persistence when it really exists in Sharpe ratios over consecutive one-year 
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Table 8. Performance Persistence Results (EGR method) for Sharpe Ratio Over 
Consecutive 1-Year Periods from Monte Carlo Generated Data Sets: Persistence 
Present by Allowing a's to Vary 
Data Generation method 
Generated Data Subgroups 1· 2b 3c 4d 
Mean returns 
top 1/3 1.66 0.31 0.27 0.16 
middle 1/3 1.01 0.21 0.18 0.13 
bottom 1/3 0.42 0.13 0.09 0.11 
top 3 2.36 0.46 0.42 0.21 
bottom 3 -0.65 -0.04 -0.09 0.08 
p-values 
reject-positive z 1.00 .995 .993 .349 
reject-negative z .000 .000 .000 .000 
fail to reject .000 .005 .007 .651 
test of 2 means 
reject-positive 1.00 .494 .471 .114 
reject-negative .000 .000 .000 .001 
fail to reject .000 .506 .529 .885 
-Oata generated using a=N(l.099,4.99), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, o=2. 
~ata generated using a=N(l.099,4.99), P=.5, a=5, 10, 15, 20. 
COata generated using a=N(l.099,4.99), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
~ata generated using a=N(l.099,1), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
periods. As with table 7, results differ across the columns, but the power of the 
Spearman's coefficient is high in all columns except for column four. Column four again 
showed a substantial failure (. 651) to reject the null. Thus, even EGR' s tests with Sharpe 
ratios had little power. Also, the test of two means works poorly with heteroskedasticity 
present. Table 9 shows the results of testing EGR's ability to find performance persistence 
when it really exists in Sharpe ratios over a four-year selection period and a one-year 
performance period. The results differ from tables 7 and 8 in that the power of the 
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Table 9. Performance Persistence Results (EGR method) for Sharpe Ratio Over 
Four-Year Selection Periods and 1-Year Performance Periods from Monte Carlo 
Generated Data Sets: Persistence Present by Allowing a's to Vary 
Data Generation method 
Generated Data Subgroups 1• 2b 3c 4d 
Mean returns 
top 1/3 1.71 0.34 0.30 0.18 
middle 1/3 0.98 0.21 0.18 0.12 
bottom 1/3 0.41 0.11 0.07 0.09 
top 3 2.55 0.56 0.49 0.26 
bottom 3 -0.91 -0.15 -0.22 0.04 
p-values 
reject-positive z 1.00 1.00 1.00 .711 
reject-negative z .000 .000 .000 .000 
fail to reject .000 .000 .000 .289 
test of 2 means 
reject-positive 1.00 .712 .695 .191 
reject-negative .000 .000 .000 .000 
fail to reject .000 .288 .305 .809 
-Oata generated using a=N(l.099,4.99), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, o=2. 
~ata generated using a=N(l.099,4.99), P=.5, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
COata generated using a=N(l.099,4.99), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
ctnata generated using a=N(l.099,1), P=.5, 1, 1.5, 2, o=5, 10, 15, 20. 
Spearman coefficient is good across all four columns. This supports our use of the four-
year selection and one-year performance periods. However, the test of two means shows 
low power. 
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Historical Performance as a Predictor of Future Performance 
Table 10 shows a summary of the results from the out-of-sample testing. Appendix 
Tables 1- 9 show the results for each year. Spearman correlation coefficients calculated 
between the selection period (4 years) and the performance period (1 year). The results 
show the average correlation calculated between the variable used in the selection period 
and the same variable from the performance period. The years positive show the 
percentage of years where the correlation was positive. A positive correlation indicates 
performance persistence was present. This follows that a fund that did well during the 
selection period also does well during the performance period. Negative correlations 
reflect the opposite of performance persistence, a fund that does well during the selection 
period does poorly during the performance period. The final column shows the percentage 
of years where the correlation was positive and significant. 
Results show each fund type contains a high percentage of years with positive 
correlations between the selection period and performance period. CTA funds show mean 
returns and the a's being positively correlated over 83% of the sample. The adjusted 
Sharpe ratio shows positive correlation between the selection period and the performance 
period in every sample. 
Table 10 shows the percentage of years with correlation positive and statistically 
significant. With the CTA data, rankings by both mean returns and a' s were positively 
correlated and significant 25% of the time. The adjusted Sharpe ratios showed a higher 
percentage of years with positive correlation that were significant at 42%. The high 
percentages of positive correlations are what was expected, a positive correlation between 
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Table 10. Summary of Spearman Correlations between Selection and Performance 
Periods 
Years 
Positive and 
Data set selection criterion Average correlation Years EOsitive {% 2 significant {% 2 
CTA 
mean returns 0.11811 83 25 
a 0.114 83 25 
ala 0.168 100 42 
Public funds 
mean returns 0.084 75 33 
a 0.088 75 33 
ala 0.202 83 42 
Private funds 
mean returns 0.068 58 17 
a 0.047 58 0 
ala 0.322 92 50 
acorrelation between a four-year selection period and a one-year performance period. 
Averages are across the twelve one-year performance period. The same statistic was used 
for the rankings in each period. 
the measurement variables in the selection period and the performance period. This 
confirms the previous results of a small amount of performance persistence. 
The average correlations of the performance measures show that for the CT A 
funds, the mean returns and the a's from the selection period explain slightly more than 
10% of the variation of the performance period for mean returns and a's. While not 
perfect positive correlation, this amount of correlation could still be useful in helping to 
select a fund in which to invest. The Sharpe ratio explains a larger amount, almost 17% of 
the variation. Results from the public funds show that the public funds do not have as high 
a percentage of positive correlations across the performance measures tested as the CTA 
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funds. 
The average correlation of the public fund mean returns and a's is smaller than 
that of the CTAfunds. The mean returns showed 8% and the a's showed 9% of the 
variation explained. These amounts could still be used in assisting in the selection of a 
fund. However, the adjusted Sharpe ratio has an average correlation of approximately 
20%. 
Results from the private funds are similar. The mean returns and the a' s have 
lower percentages of positive correlations than the CTA and public funds. Both measures 
had 58% of the years with positive correlations. As with the CTA data and the public 
funds, the adjusted Sharpe ratio had the highest percentage of years with positive 
correlations at 92%. 
For the private funds, the mean returns showed only 17% of the years with 
positive correlations as being significant. Thea's for private funds showed no significant 
positive correlations. However, the adjusted Sharpe ratio showed that 50% of the years 
with positive correlations were significant. This appears to indicate that the Sharpe ratio 
exhibits the most persistence of any of the three performance measures tested. 
Results from the private funds show that the mean returns and the a' s have the 
lowest average correlation of any of the three funds. Mean returns have only 7% of the 
variation explained while the a's has only 5% explained. The adjusted Sharpe ratios have 
the highest average correlation of any variable in any fund with over 32% of the variation 
explained. This could be a valuable tool in predicting future Sharpe ratios for funds with 
past Sharpe ratio values. 
Results indicate that in CTA funds, private funds, and public funds, mean returns 
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and a.'s can be indicators of future performance, but with limited success. These two 
variables show that some persistence is present in regards to future performance. 
However, it should be noted that the adjusted Sharpe ratios for each of the funds seemed 
to exhibit the most persistence of any of the performance variables. For all the fund types, 
the measure of risk variable (adjusted Sharpe's ratio) is a good indicator of future Sharpe 
ratios. Past research has found risk measures often had persistence present. Positive 
correlation indicates risk measures are a good measure of a funds risk in trading. 
Regardless of the performance measure used, there is some positive correlation 
indicating performance persistence. The small correlations are consistent with the 
regression results. While there is performance persistence present, it is difficult to 
distinguish because of all the other random factors involved in influencing returns. 
The return/risk measure (adjusted Sharpe Ratio) clearly shows the most 
performance persistence. Rankings based on mean returns are similar to the rankings 
based on a.'s. As the appendix shows, their correlations are similar in each year. Therefore, 
there does not appear to be as much gain as expected in adjusting for the overall level of 
returns. 
Appendix Tables 1 through 9 show the individual selection and performance 
period results. Appendix Tables 1-3 show the results from the CTA data. Mean returns 
and a.'s show negative correlations between selection period and the performance period 
for two periods, but neither is significant. Adjusted Sharpe ratio results show no negative 
correlations in any of the periods. All three measures have significant positive correlations 
in the same three periods. The strongest persistence appears in the adjusted Sharpe ratio. 
Appendix Tables 4-6 show results from the public fund data. The a.'s show three 
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periods with negative correlation, one of which was significant. However, four periods 
were found to have significant positive correlations, all of which are greater than .25. 
Results from the mean returns correlation show four periods with significant positive 
correlations with values all greater than .25. Mean returns and a's both exhibit small 
amounts of persistence. The adjusted Sharpe ratio had five periods with significant 
positive correlations, more than either of the other performance measures, indicating more 
persistence was present.. 
Appendix Tables 7-9 show the results from the private fund data. Results from the 
a' s showed periods with negative and positive correlations, none of which were 
significant. Returns showed two periods with significant positive correlations. The 
adjusted Sharpe ratios exhibited the most persistence. 
This brings up the question as to why these results differ from past results? EGR 
dismissed evidence of persistence as small and insignificant. However, here the percentage 
of years with a statistically significant positive correlation is too large to dismiss. While the 
size of the correlations may be small relative to a correlation of one, the correlations are 
larger than expected if there were no performance persistence. Also, the adjusted Sharpe 
ratios have the largest average correlations of any measure. This correlation indicates that 
some persistence exists in the risk levels for the funds. Larger samples now available now 
allow more powerful tests. 
McCarthy found persistence present but discounted the results due to the small 
sample size. IKZ used a method which separated the funds into quintiles. This method led 
to low power and difficulty in interpretation and therefore it is difficult to say whether a 
positive or negative correlation was found. Schwager found a similar correlation of. 07 for 
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mean returns. Schwager, however, found a negative correlation for his return/risk 
measure. Schwager ranked funds based on return/risk when returns were positive, but 
ranked on returns only when returns were negative. This hybrid measure may have led to 
the negative correlation. Therefore, past literature is consistent with a minimal amount of 
performance persistence. The large sample size and improved testing methods allowed us 
to find performance persistence. The appearance of negative correlations between 
selection periods and performance periods coupled with insignificant positive correlations 
show that small samples yield erratic results. 
Historical Performance as a Predictor of Future Performance 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson Nonparametric Method 
Tables 11-15 present the results from evaluating if historical mean returns are 
predictive of future returns using the methods used by Goetzmann and Ibbotson. The 
results are presented in the form of two-way tables. The two-way tables present the 
number of funds in each classification, winner or loser in the selection period and winner 
or loser in the performance period. Table 11 shows the results from the two-year selection 
and performance period using the mean raw returns as a performance measure. Table 11 
shows funds that were classified as winners in the selection period were more likely to also 
be winners in the performance period. The cumulative results show the combined results 
of all periods, indicating the ratio associated with picking a winner. The percentages 
presented below the summed totals represent the percentage of total funds that fall into 
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Table 11. Two-Way Tables of Ranked CTA Fund Raw Returns over Successive 
Two-Year Intervals 
1982- 1982- 1986- 1986-
1983 1983 1987 1987 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1980-1981 1984-1985 
Winners 13 6 Winners 25 14 
Losers 6 10 Losers 14 25 
1990- 1.990- 1994- 1994-
1991 1991 1995 1995 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1988-1989 1992-1993 
Winners 44 37 Winners 71 47 
Losers 37 44 Losers 47 71 
Combined Results Over All Years 
Two Year Successive Periods 
Winners Losers 
Selection Period 
Winners 153 104 
59.5% 40.5% 
Losers 104 150 
40.9% 59.1% 
each selection period and subsequent performance period classification (winner or loser). 
The winners-winners category shows that winners in the selection period were also 
winners in the performance period roughly 60% of the time. 
Table 12 shows the results from the three-year selection and performance period 
using the raw returns as a performance measure. The cumulative results show that like the 
successive two-year intervals, winners in the selection period are likely to be winners in 
the performance period roughly 60% of the time. The percentages of winners in the 
selection period that also win in the performance period are consistent across the samples. 
The ratios are roughly 60/40 in both samples, confirming that persistence is present. 
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Table 12. Two-Way Tables of Ranked CTA Fund Raw Returns over Successive 
Three-Year Intervals 
1980-1982 
Winners 
Losers 
Selection Period 
Winners 
Losers 
1983-
1985 
Winners 
9 
6 
1983-
1985 
Losers 
5 
9 
1986-1988 
Winners 
Losers 
Combined Results Over All Years 
Three Year Successive Periods 
Winners Losers 
41 27 
60.3% 39.7% 
28 42 
40% 60% 
1989-
1991 
Winners 
32 
22 
1989-
1991 
Losers 
22 
33 
Table 13 shows the results from the three-year selection period and two-year 
performance period using the raw returns as a performance measure. The results from the 
1980-1984 sample may be split to a nearly 50/50 ratio due to the small number of funds in 
Table 13. Two-Way Tables of Ranked CTA Fund Raw Returns over a Three Year 
Selection Period and I a Two-Year Performance Period 
1983- 1983- 1988- 1988-
1984 1984 1989 1989 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1980-1982 1985-1987 
Winners 8 7 Winners 30 21 
Losers 8 8 Losers 21 30 
1993- 1993- Combined Results 
1994 1994 All Periods 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1990-1992 Selection Period 
Winners 70 45 Winners 108 73 
59.7% 40.3% 
Losers 45 70 Losers 74 108 
40.7% 59.3% 
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the sample. Table 13 confirms what the prior two tables found, winners in the selection 
period are winners in the performance period roughly 60% of the time. 
When selection and performance periods are set to contain multiple years, some 
persistence of performance is present. The results show for each of the selection and 
performance scenarios, a fund's relative performance in the selection period has some 
predictive ability as to the relative performance of that fund in the future. Winners tend to 
continue as winners more often than losing. 
Table 14 shows the results from the one year selection and performance period 
using the raw returns as a performance measure. The results from this table show that 
winners in the selection period have roughly a 50% chance of also being a winner in the 
performance period. In three of the eight samples, winners in the selection period exhibit a 
greater chance of being winners ( = 60%)in the performance period. However, four of the 
samples showed roughly a 50% chance of being winners in the performance period after 
being classified a winner in the selection period. The final sample showed a 45% chance of 
winners repeating. Overall, there is no consistent persistence found. Based on the 
cumulative results of a one-year selection period and a one-year performance period, fund 
classification in the selection period has little predictive ability as to the fund's 
performance in the future. The results indicate that a funds future performance could not 
be accurately predicted from past performance. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis of no performance persistence. 
Table 15 shows the results from the two year selection,period and a one year 
performance period using the raw returns as a performance measure. The results are 
consistent with the results from Table 14. Winners in the selection period have a roughly 
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Table 14. Two-Way Tables of Ranked CTA Fund Raw Returns over a One-Year 
Selection Period and a One-Year Performance Period 
1981 1981 1983 1983 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1980 1982 
Winners 10 10 Winners 18 12 
Losers 10 11 Losers 11 18 
1985 1985 1987 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1984 1986 
Winners 23 20 Winners 41 39 
Losers 21 23 Losers 39 40 
1989 1989 1991 1991 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1988 1990 
Winners 58 44 Winners 81 55 
Losers 44 58 Losers 55 81 
1993 1993 1995 1995 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1992 1994 
Winners 90 92 Winners 83 103 
Losers 92 90 Losers 102 83 
Combined Results Over All Years 
One Year Successive Periods 
Winners Losers 
Selection Period 
Winners 404 375 
51.9% 48.1% 
Losers 374 404 
48.1% 51.9% 
50% chance of also being winners in the performance period. It is noted that the two most 
recent samples seem to exhibit some persistence with winners having roughly a 60% 
chance of being a winner in the performance period. The early samples show little or no 
signs of persistence, however. 
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The results show persistence is present in mean returns when multiple year 
selection and performance periods are selected. Persistence is not present when the 
performance period is set to one year. The results do not change as the selection period is 
extended from one to four years, therefore demonstrating the results are robust. 
Table 15. Two-Way Tables of Ranked CTA Fund Raw Returns over a Two-Year 
Selection Period and a One-Year Performance Period 
1982 1982 1985 1985 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1980-1981 1983-1984 
Winners 9 11 Winners 10 18 
Losers 10 9. Losers 20 11 
1988 1988 1991 1991 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1986-1987 1989-1990 
Winners 38 36 Winners 55 46 
Losers 36 39 Losers 47 55 
1994 1994 Combined Results 
All Periods 
Winners Losers Winners Losers 
1992-1993 Selection Period 
Winners 58 44 Winners 193 183 
51.3% 48.7% 
Losers 44 58 Losers 186 195 
48.8% 51.2% 
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CHAPTERV 
SUMMARY 
Commodity fund managers are required by law to release records of past 
performance in the prospectus of the funds they manage. This raises the question, is past 
performance indicative of future performance? Can past measures of performance predict 
how a fund will do in the future? This study analyzed a method used by prior research to 
determine if a key assumption ofhomoskedasticity was correct. Using a selection period 
and a performance period, several measures of performance were tested to determine if 
past fund performance is correlated with future fund performance. 
One ofEGR's methods assumes homoskedasticity and data reported disputes the 
assumption of homoskedasticity in fund returns. By using estimated generalized least 
squares (EGLS) to correct for heteroskedasticity, the problem is alleviated. When the 
problem is corrected, the EGLS regression analysis shows that all fund returns do not 
have the same mean. 
The Monte Carlo simulation addressed the question of whether EGR' s method of 
testing for performance persistence has any power to reject a false null hypothesis of no 
performance persistence in mean returns. EGR' s method consisted of a rank correlation 
coefficient. The test statistic calculated was the Spearman correlation coefficient. The test 
statistic was calculated by ranking the variable of interest during the selection period and 
the performance period, then calculating the correlation between the rankings. The amount 
of correlation between the measure of performance in the selection period and the measure 
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of performance in the performance period and the statistical significance of the correlation 
coefficients were then evaluated. 
Data sets were generated with persistence present and with no persistence present. 
The Monte Carlo study also generated and tested several data sets where assumptions 
made by EGR' s method are violated. The test revealed the method used by EGR has high 
power when persistence is present and heteroskedasticity is not. The Monte Carlo study 
showed that heteroskedasticity created some problems with size, but the problems were 
small. EGR' s methods had good power except when the performance persistence was 
small and heteroskedasticity was present (which was the case with EGR's data). EGR's 
method has greater power when the Sharpe ratio was the measure of performance and the 
selection period was four years and the performance period was one year. The weakness 
of the Sharpe ratio is that persistence can be due either to persistence in mean or 
persistence in variance. The assumption ofhomoskedasticity made in the EGR study may 
have caused no persistence to be found where persistence was present. This could lead to 
the incorrect conclusion by investors that performance persistence does not exist in mean 
returns or the a's. 
Three measures of historical performance were used to select which funds 
performed the best during the selection period. The measures chosen for evaluation of 
performance persistence are the returns of the fund, the a's (intercept) for each fund, and 
an adjusted Sharpe ratio (ala) to measure the risk of the fund. These measures had the 
rank correlation calculated between the value of that variable during the selection period 
and the performance period. The Spearman coefficient was calculated and it was found 
that the return/risk measure showed the most predictability in ranking from the selection 
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period to the performance period. 
Even with the heteroskedasticity corrected, while the results do not conclusively 
show that the intercepts and the mean returns of the funds are good indicators oflater 
performance of funds, the results do suggest that the intercepts and mean returns have 
some predictive ability. The information contained in these variables appears to have a 
small but valid ability to help in identifying superior performing funds. The a. la's 
consistently show that they do have some predictive ability. The inclusion of the variability 
of the fund seems to add relevant information that does have some predictive value. This 
measure does show that by including returns and variability, this can help an investor 
select the better performing funds. 
It should be pointed out that the regression approach and not the rank correlations 
used in this study, allows funds that have been traded for differing amounts of time to be 
compared and allows for use of all the·data. This differs from past methods in that those 
methods can only use funds that have been traded during the same amount of time. 
Using Goetzmann and Ibbotsons method on CTAfund data, results showed that 
winners tend to stay winners by a ratio of roughly 60/40 when the selection period and 
performance period are both greater than one year.Thi.sis consistent with the ratio found 
in mutual funds. The ratio of winners staying winners fell to 50/50 when a one-year 
performance period was chosen. This ratio was relatively unchanged for a selection period 
of one, two, three, or four years. The results appear to show that funds with mean returns 
above the median fund return for the selection period tend to have mean returns that are 
above the median fund return for the performance period. This persistence is present when 
multiple-year selection periods and multiple-year performance periods are evaluated. The 
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persistence is not present when one-year performance periods are selected, regardless of 
the length of the selection period. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study chose to use a four year selection period in testing for performance 
persistence using EGR' s methods. This selection period is a narrowly defined period of 
performance evaluation and does not imply that different selection periods, longer or 
shorter, could not be useful in finding the optimal selection period. 
There may still be a small problem with survivorship bias. The survivorship bias is 
caused by a fund no longer being traded. This could be the result of several things. The 
fund may have consistently performed poorly and lost·most or all of the capital invested in 
it and went out of business. The fund may also have been bought out by another fund or 
merged with another fund. In both cases, the bought-out fund is not available anymore to 
investors and its returns are not known. 
This survivorship bias comes in the form of testing for performance persistence 
will be conducted only on the "surviving" funds. The "surviving" funds are those funds 
that either have not been bought up or gone out of business. Performance persistence may 
exist in the funds that did poorly, however, since the fund is no longer traded, the 
persistence may not be found. For funds that are bought up by othe( funds, no distinction 
is made between bought-out funds and funds that went out of business, the fund simply 
stops trading. The funds with poorer track records tend to disappear over time. The fund 
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may have been performing well and hence, was purchased by another fund and merged. 
The merged fund may have had persistence present, but it may not be found since the fund 
was bought and merged with another fund. 
However, since performance is not measured against an absolute benchmark such 
as a market-based index, the S&P 500, but rather against the other "survivor" funds for 
relative performance, the problem may be partially mitigated. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
For the selection period, a more diverse variety and evaluation of selection periods 
could be completed including shorter selection periods and longer selection periods. It 
may also interesting to evaluate if the performance period has a lag greater than one year 
from the selection period. This is to say that the selection period predicts performance in 
the latter part of the performance period. This would be interesting to find if changes in 
the fund take time to develop and show positive returns. This asks the question, are 
changes made in the fund instantaneously reflected in higher returns? 
Another line of research that may be studied from this area is to study the length of 
time a fund that consistently does poorly lasts before it is dropped. This area.could be 
helpful in determining the plateau investors have in fund returns that gives the investor 
incentive to withdraw from a fund that is doing poorly. Ideally, the investor tracks their 
fund closely, but after how much time with poor returns, does the investor decide to 
withdraw from the fund and invest elsewhere? Is there a timetable that the investor has in 
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mind as to how long the investor will give the fund manager to earn returns that are 
considered satisfactory? 
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Conclusions 
The primary conclusion is that some funds consistently have higher returns than 
others. While the differences are small, the differences are statistically significant and were 
found with a variety of methods. 
The second point is that past studies have made assumptions about the data that 
are not correct for evaluating performance variables that do not include some measure of 
risk. By making these assumptions, the prior studies results are not strictly valid for 
performance variables with no risk measure included. Using a nonparametric method in 
evaluating persistence is acceptable when the correct assumptions are made, the variables 
are transformed to remove the problem of an incorrect assumption, or the performance 
variables includes a measure of risk. 
The third point is that after correcting the data for heteroskedasticity, the study 
shows that the Sharpe ratio does have some predictive ability as to the future returns of 
the fund. This shows some of the past research results using Sharpe ratios are valid. The 
predictive ability is shown to be present in the private, public, and combined CTA data. 
Data indicate that investors would want to look at historical Sharpe ratios as a factor in 
determining in which funds to invest. For this study, the prior 4 years Sharpe ratios had 
significant predictive ability, but the data suggest that the data from the last year should be 
deleted. If managing money, the rationale should be to include the prior 4 years Sharpe 
ratios in the decision making process because this measure has shown to have some 
predictive ability. However, it should be noted that longer selection periods should not be 
dismissed as useless. Although not perfect predictors, by explaining even 2% of the 
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variation of the mean return investor return can be improved over time. 
The ability to explain a small amount of the variation in fund returns allows the 
investor to predict with some certainty a return that the fund will have. Although much of 
the variability will be unpredictable, by predicting a small amount of the variability of the 
mean return, it may be possible to substantially change the mean return of the fund, 
perhaps even so much as to double the mean return. In summary, the mean returns are 
indicative of future relative performance, if properly adjusted. Based on this important 
point in evaluating the results, perhaps prospectuses should include information on how to 
interpret past performance. 
The answer to the question asked earlier about the validity of the disclaimer 
statement required in a prospectus is dependent on the definition of"indicative". If 
"indicative" is defined as past returns are an unbiased estimator of future returns, then the 
answer to the question would be no. Edwards and Ma (1988) showed that past returns are 
a biased estimator of future returns, thus showing that selectivity bias was present. 
However, if"indicative" is defined as past returns have some predictive ability in 
predicting future returns, than yes, the statement is mostly true. The measures of 
performance tested in this study do have some predictive ability. However, it should be 
pointed out that in relative terms, the results presented in this study seem to show that 
funds that perform better than other fu~ds in the past tend to perform better than those 
same other funds in the future. Perhaps the disclaimer statement should be modified to 
reflect the specific nature of performance persistence found. 
Overall, results indicate that a small amount of persistence is present in public, 
private, and CTA funds. Although the amount of persistence is small relative to the 
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variation in the data, but large relative to the mean. The out-of-sample tests confirmed the 
results from the regression, a small amount of performance persistence. It is important to 
point out that this small amount of persistence makes it difficult to select the best single 
fund and therefore selecting a portfolio of funds is advisable. There is a possibility of 
picking the best set of funds, but precise methods and large amounts of historical data are 
required. In making these selections, the inclusion of a risk/return measure is necessary to 
give the investor as much information as possible to make informed investments in funds. 
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Appendix A 
Tables Listing Spearman Coefficients From Public, 
Private, and CTA Data Sets. 
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Table 1. Spearman's Coefficient between Selection a and Performance a and Mean 
a's: Combined CTA Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period r• b C s «se1 (X per 
1980-84 -0.063 1.913 -0.338 
1981-85 0.345*d 1.467 1.120 
1982-86 0.260 1.593 -0.106 
1983-87 0.176 1.320 2.529 
1984-88 0.056 1.789 1.662 
1985-89 0.122 2.387 0.055 
1986-90 0.229* 1.871 1.881 
1987-91 0.053 1.992 0.760 
1988-92 0.005 1.232 0.547 
1989-93 0.071 0.997 1.252 
1990-94 0.188* 1.037 0.192 
1991-95 -0.080 0.682 1.086 
aspearman;s Correlation coefficient. 
bMean of a's of selection period. 
cMean of a' s of performance period. 
dAsterisks indicate significance at .05 level. 
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Table 2. Spearman's Coefficient between Selection Returns and Performance 
Return and Mean Returns: Combined CTA Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period r, mean.ei a b mean per 
1980-84 -0.070 1.913 -0.347 
1981-85 0.335*c 1.465 1.191 
1982-86 0.256 1.594 -0.095 
1983-87 0.176 1.320 2.529 
1984-88 0.059 1.790 1.663 
1985-89 0.133 2.387 0.063 
1986-90 0.230* 1.871 1.873 
1987-91 0.052 1.994 0.738 
1988-92 0.009 1.233 0.510 
1989-93 0.083 0.997 1.242 
1990-94 0.199* 1.035 0.183 
1991-95 -0.042 0.677 1.112 
1Mean returns of selection period. 
~ean returns of performance period. 
cAsterisks indicate significance at .05 level. 
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Table 3. Spearman's Coefficients between Selection a.la and Performance a.la and 
Mean a.la's: Combined CTA Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period rs (a./a),et ( a./a)perb 
1980-84 0.060 1.462 -0.007 
1981-85 0.330*c 1.209 0.658 
1982-86 0.122 1.400 0.016 
1983-87 0.217 1.091 1.293 
1984-88 0.126 1.493 0.815 
1985-89 0.165 1.776 0.052 
1986-90 0.242* 1.419 1.314 
1987-91 0.242* 1.726 0.589 
1988-92 0.112 1.322 0.624 
1989-93 0.168* 1.262 1.099 
1990-94 0.235* 1.511 0.175 
1991-95 0.002 1.084 1.092 
a Adjusted Sharpe ratio for selection period. 
b Adjusted Sharpe ratio for performance period. 
cAsterisks indicate significance at .05 level. 
76 
Table 4. Spearman's Coefficient between Selection a and Performance a and Mean 
a;'s: Public Fund Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period ra b C 
• 
a,eJ ex per 
1980-84 0.619*d 0.614 0.605 
1981-85 -0.257 0.523 0.871 
1982-86 0.007 0.686 -2.592 
1983-87 0.054 0.307 2.236 
1984-88 -0.057 0.924 0.624 
1985-89 -0.442* 0.886 -1.150 
1986-90 0.063 0.450 1.195 
1987-91 0.291 * 0.761 0.720 
1988-92 0.274* 0.237 0.145 
1989-93 0.166 0.275 0.673 
1990-94 0.035 0.434 -0.547 
1991-95 0.304* 0.090 0.959 
as pearman' s Correlation coefficient. 
bMean of ex' s of selection period. 
cMean of ex's of performance period. 
dAsterisks indicate significance at .05 level. 
77 
Table 5. Spearman's Coefficient between Selection Returns and Performance 
Return and Mean Returns: Public Fund Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period r. mean.e1a mea~erb 
1980-84 0.575*c 0.605 0.604 
1981-85 -0.279 0.515 0.849 
1982-86 0.000 0.702 -2.604 
1983-87 0.057 0.310 2.232 
1984-88 -0.056 0.924 0.624 
1985-89 -0.442* 0.886 -1.150 
1986-90 0.063 0.450 1.195 
1987-91 0.317* 0.762 0.730 
1988-92 0.274* 0.237 0.145 
1989-93 0.166 0.275 0.673 
1990-94 0.030 0.435 -0.543 
1991-95 0.306* 0.090 0.963 
aMean returns of selection period. 
bMean returns of performance period. 
cAsterisks indicate significance at .05 level. 
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Table 6. Spearman's Coefficients between Selection a.la and Performance a.la and 
Mean a.la's: Public Fund Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period r. ( a.la)./ ( ala )9ecb 
1980-84 0.658*c 0.729 0.395 
1981-85 0.426 0.856 0.977 
1982-86 -0.039 0.937 -0.895 
1983-87 0.142 0.424 1.782 
1984-88 0.076 1.240 0.819 
1985-89 -0.246* 1.228 -0.523 
1986-90 0.177 0.731 1.191 
1987-91 0.261 * 1.308 0.551 
1988-92 0.320* 0.605 0.117 
1989-93 0.205* 0.611 0.829 
1990-94 0.015 0.952 -0.442 
1991-95 0.434* 0.423 1.084 
a Adjusted Sharpe ratio for selection period. 
b Adjusted Sharpe ratio for performance period. 
cAsterisks indicate significance at .05 level. 
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Table 7. Spearman's Coefficient between Selection a and Performance a and Mean 
a's: Private Fund Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period ra b C s <X,eJ a per 
1980-84 -0.127 1.824 1.360 
1981-85 -0.182 1.224 1.384 
1982-86 -0.027 1.562 0.007 
1983-87 0.168 1.364 2.549 
1984-88 -0.097 1.492 1.323 
1985-89 0.298 1.651 0.022 
1986-90 0.253 1.677 1.676 
1987-91 0.019 1.564 0.697 
1988-92 0.115 0.794 0.388 
1989-93 0.120 0.774 0.998 
1990-94 -0.030 0.937 0.203 
1991-95 0.056 0.420 1.061 
aspearman's Correlation coefficient. 
bMean of a' s of selection period. 
'Mean of a's of performance period. 
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Table 8. Spearman's Coefficient between Selection Returns and Performance 
Return and Mean Returns: Private Fund Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period r. mean.e1 a meat1gerb 
1980-84 -0.079 1.961 1.360 
1981-85 -0.182 1.282 1.442 
1982-86 -0.027 1.557 -0.148 
1983-87 0.202 1.361 2.407 
1984-88 -0.033 1.492 0.979 
1985-89 0.324*c 1.666 -0.051 
1986-90 0.288* 1.676 1.720 
1987-91 0.013 1.565 0.718 
1988-92 0.114 0.794 0.400 
1989-93 0.149 0.774 1.029 
1990-94 -0.008 0.937 0.194 
1991-95 0.056 0.419 1.067 
8Mean returns of selection period. 
'M:ean returns of performance period. 
cAsterisks indicate significance at .05 level. 
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Table 9. Spearman's Coefficients between Selection a/a and Performance a/a and 
Mean a/o's: Private Fund Data 
Years in selection and 
performance period r, (a/a),et (a.Ia )per b 
1980-84 0.406 3.021 1.466 
1981-85 0.464 2.272 2.349 
1982-86 -0.038 2.612 0.601 
1983-87 0.430*c 1.575 2.186 
1984-88 0.319 1.723 1.448 
1985-89 0.345* 1.523 0.468 
1986-90 0.586* 1.538 1.275 
1987-91 0.228 1.867 0.691 
1988-92 0.199 1.251 0.907 
1989-93 0.298* 1.244 1.300 
1990-94 0.315* 1.767 0.657 
1991-95 0.310* 1.164 1.320 
a Adjusted Sharpe ratio for selection period. 
b Adjusted Sharpe ratio for performance period. 
cAsterisks indicate significance at .05 level. 
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